U.S. Representative Pete Olson of Sugar Land, a member of the House Subcommittee on Energy and Power, proclaimed Luminant to be "one of the latest victims of an agency that is out of control."
Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott, who many predict will succeed Perry (if he doesn't seek re-election), sued the agency to halt the rule.
Peter Ryan
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While the pols were scapegoating the EPA, they ignored a plain, painful reality: Power supplies in Texas have not kept up with the state's booming population. Our deregulated market has given us higher electric rates, but it hasn't been enough for power producers to see the potential profits they need to justify building pricey new generation plants. And Luminant? During the big freeze, its parent company, Energy Future Holdings — the company that merged with TXU in 2007 through the largest leveraged buyout in history — was sweating a refinancing it hoped would extend the maturities on nearly $18 billion in debts it could not afford to pay.
When the Observer asked the business manager of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 2337, which represents the men and women running Luminant's plants, whether cost-cutting contributed to the failure of four of its units during that winter storm, Randall Pierce replied succinctly: "Yes."
For the moment, though, Luminant had managed to whip state politicos into a fearful frenzy. And while all eyes were focused on the agency at the center of it, few were paying attention to Luminant's books, or to a system in which Texas is nearly isolated, and where blackouts could become a fact of life.
Goldman Sachs and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, the latter the investment firm that in 1988 bought RJR Nabisco in what was at the time the largest leveraged buyout in history, lusted after TXU in 2006, and it was easy to see why.
The company's vitals were strong. At that moment, the energy market beamed beatifically on its fleet of coal-fired power plants. That's because in Texas' ERCOT region, the price of natural gas — which fires the biggest chunk of the state's power plants — sets the market price for electricity. After Hurricane Katrina ravaged Gulf Coast pipelines and pinched off supply, that price soared as if it might never stop. TXU had an army of coal-fired plants with low-fixed costs and a ready supply of lignite coal that allowed the company to produce electricity for a fraction of what it could sell it for. On paper, those plants probably looked like they could print money.
In April 2006, just a few days before Earth Day, TXU announced plans to build 11 more coal-fired plants, virtually guaranteeing that the DFW area would never comply with federal air quality standards. Environmentalists and a coalition of Texas mayors vowed to stop them. The stage was set for KKR and its buyout group to gallantly ride into Texas, playing the role of men in white hats who would rescue the state from the smoggy future TXU had in store for it. It was at the height of the mid-aughts buyout binge, and this wasn't KKR's first rodeo. Their bid to buy power companies in Oregon and Arizona had been rebuffed by state legislatures suspicious of the company's motives. This time, KKR and its partners left nothing to chance. They recruited as advisers and lobbyists heavyweights like former Dallas Mayor Ron Kirk and former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III. They courted environmentalists and lawmakers, greasing the rails with nearly $20 million in political contributions.
The buyout group made clear that, if it bought TXU, the multibillion-dollar plans to build 11 coal-fired plants would be scrapped; they'd only build three. KKR, Goldman, TPG Capital and their newly formed company, Energy Future Holdings — which as yet had no assets — were hailed as heroes. The Environmental Defense Fund announced a green partnership with KKR, whose enterprise value was $410 billion and whose holdings included healthcare behemoth HCA.
KKR and Energy Future were going to usher in the new, green dawn of Texas. They were going to join the U.S. Climate Action Partnership to help enact "environmentally effective and economically sustainable climate change programs." And they were willing to pay TXU's shareholders $45 billion for the privilege of dragging the utility out of its dirty past and into the sustainable age.
Never mind that KKR's plan would involve saddling the acquired company with debt, slashing costs and flipping it for a 20-percent profit in five years — or failing that, liquidating its assets. Or that the company never had any financial incentive to bring 11 new plants online, which would only drive down the cost of electricity and its profits. Texas environmentalists, for once, had reason for optimism.
Chief Executive Officer John Wilder and other TXU management, on the other hand, clearly had doubts about the wisdom guiding their suitor's overtures. In a packet sent to investors to convince them to consent to the buyout, TXU management pointed out that the transport cost of coal had risen by as much as 100 percent.
Sure, gas prices were high now, they added, but if TXU or Energy Future wanted to break even, natural gas prices couldn't dip below $6.35 per million British Thermal Units.