And slap that lid on fast!
Let me try to put this in context. On October 3, Mitchell E. Daniels Jr., who is director of the President's Office of Management and Budget, wrote to Thomas E. White, the Secretary of the Army, informing White that the OMB had found serious flaws in the Trinity River project in Dallas. The project is a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers undertaking.
Daniels said the most egregious flaws were centered on three things: 1) a failure to look at a simpler, much cheaper fix that would have provided far superior flood protection to downtown Dallas; 2) a fiddling of the Corps' own rules and regulations for determining the economic benefits of the program; and 3) a failure to look at ways to solve downstream flooding, especially in the heavily polluted area of Cadillac Heights, by buying people out and moving them from harm's way instead of building an expensive new levee to more or less lock them into place.
When Daniels' letter became public, the proponents of the river plan took to the airways and even the courts with all sorts of hyperventilated attacks on the OMB. Example: The city of Dallas, in a formal pleading in federal court in Fort Worth (the regional headquarters of the Corps), claimed that the OMB had been hoodwinked by an environmentalist working for the plaintiffs, and they cited as proof an article by me in the Dallas Observer ("Chinatown," October 18, 2001). I had reported in that story that Larry Dunbar, a hydrology expert and consultant to the plaintiffs, had been consulted by the OMB in its investigation of the project.
I feel very aggrandized by the whole notion of my having a part in a potential hoodwinking of the Office of Management and Budget. I tried to suggest to my son at dinner that I was being accused indirectly of helping to pull a fast one on the West Wing, just like on TV, and that it all had to do with a letter from the OMB. He seemed to ponder it for a while and then asked me again not to wear his letter jacket when I walk the dogs. I'm gonna run that kid for city council some day.
But we make silly here. The OMB has entire staffs of subject-matter experts who review programs and appropriations in all the major areas of activity of the federal government. The "Dallas Floodway Extension," as it is officially known, is an example of just the kind of federal waste George W. Bush vowed to root out when he took office. In his budget agenda for 2002, the president promised "to provide a greater focus on performance."
The Trinity project doesn't do what it's designed to do. It makes flooding worse, not better. It costs a lot of money and doesn't deliver a good enough benefit to justify the expense.
The Trinity River project is the very first one of its kind nationally that the OMB has chosen to red-flag under these new criteria. They are sending a great big loud Roman candle across our bow.
With a lot of lobbying help from Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison and U.S. Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, the Dallas delegation was able to push through this year's appropriation to begin construction on the project anyway, essentially end-running the OMB for now. But the Dallas project is still very much in the crosshairs of the OMB. The 2003 presidential budget is due out in February, and the Dallas Floodway Extension Project will not be in it.
The focus on this project is only going to get sharper over the course of the next year. If the Bush people allow the Trinity River project to slip through again into next year's budget, given the truly devastating findings of the OMB, they can forget about horsing around with anybody else's pork-barrel goodies anywhere else in the country, at least in terms of this initiative.
At a recent city council briefing, the staff of City Manager Ted Benavides made an all-out hard-sell pitch for the council to ignore all of these problems and go ahead and sign a binding agreement to complete the project as it is currently designed, including all of the features the OMB has red-flagged. First Assistant City Manager Mary K. Suhm, in particular, insisted to the council that being removed from the president's budget was a sort of minor bookkeeping detail that changed nothing about the project's ultimate fate.