The Secretary of Defense has vowed an investigation, and congressional hearings are already under way into charges that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the agency in charge of the nation's waterways, has been doing fake studies to justify big construction projects and a fatter budget for itself. Critics of the Trinity River project are already offering what they say is evidence of big-time fakery the Corps did here.
These are big stakes for Dallas.
Whenever critics complained about the cost, basic design, or ultimate safety of the Trinity River project, boosters were quick to say that it meets the standards of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as if that shield alone could turn any arrow or stone.
But what if the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers tells big fat lies?
U.S. Special Counsel Elaine Kaplan, whose agency hears whistleblower complaints from federal employees, notified Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen last week that she had found "substantial likelihood" that the Corps broke laws and engaged in "gross waste of funds" in a project on the Upper Mississippi. Kaplan's investigation corroborated charges by Corps economist Donald C. Sweeney II that the Corps had rigged a $50 million study in order to justify a $1 billion construction project.
So what about other projects? What about ours?
If there is no fire yet in Dallas, there is black smoke. Last week a hydrologist working for a citizens group pointed to what he said may be hamfisted manipulations of data by the Corps to justify the Trinity project.
Also last week, a joint report of two national environmental groups said the Trinity River project is one of the 25 worst "wasteful water projects" being carried out by the Corps nationally. The report, called "Troubled Waters," was published by Taxpayers for Common Sense and the National Wildlife Federation -- two groups with enough national prestige to guarantee a new look at the Trinity project.
The allegations against the Corps by one of its own economists, backed up by the special counsel, have to do with basic processes that would run through all Corps activities if they ran through any. The top management people named by Sweeney as having pressured him to fudge his reports on the Upper Mississippi have also been involved in the Trinity project.
Flood-control projects like the Trinity River -- along with federal highways, airports, harbors, all the big federal construction projects -- have to meet certain criteria set by law. If you want to build it, you have to prove first that it's needed. Then you have to show specifically that the benefits of building it are greater than the costs.
Even before the special counsel forwarded her findings, Army Secretary Louis Caldera had ordered a special review of a billion-dollar barge project on the Upper Mississippi after Sweeney blew the whistle. Sweeney alleged he had been leaned on, bullied, and eventually yanked from a $50 million study of the Mississippi project in order to make the study come out the way his superiors wanted. (You can read Sweeney's affidavit at www.environmentaldefense.org.)
Sweeney said in his affidavit that responsible, by-the-book expert studies kept finding that the $1 billion navigation project under consideration on the Upper Mississippi wasn't worth the dollars it would cost. He said a top Corps officer "told me to find a way to justify large-scale measures in the near term for the [Upper Mississippi] navigation system or [he] would find an economist who would, and I would be out of my job as technical manager of the economics work group. As I remember, he asked if I had a family to support or words to that effect."
The whistleblower story was actually the second fire alarm at the Corps of Engineers in recent weeks. The first was spawned by stories in The Washington Post reporting that the top military brass in the Corps had been promoting a more or less secret in-house agenda of aggressive public works construction that even the civilian head of the Corps didn't know about.
And here is where we begin to draw closer to the Trinity. From the very beginning, when the Corps announced it wanted to build major new levees through southern Dallas where none had existed before, critics of the project wondered why. After the disastrous Mississippi floods of 1993, a national study commissioned by the White House found that new levees and new construction generally are a bad way to prevent floods. It's cheaper, safer, and more cost-effective to buy people out and get them away from the river and up on high ground, the study found.